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hopes that Taiwan’s counterintelligence 
efforts are indeed that good, but readers 
probably recall that the John Walker spy 
ring operated for over fifteen years in the 
United States during the Cold War, caus-
ing enormous harm� Doubtless, Taiwan 
works hard to catch spies—as did the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation during 
the Cold War—but it just does not 
seem credible that Taiwan is immune 
to effective Chinese espionage efforts� 
Readers also might be forgiven for 
doubting the author’s claim of Chinese 
counterintelligence ineptitude if recent 
reports in the press describing Beijing’s 
destruction of Central Intelligence 
Agency networks in China are accurate�
The perils inherent in the book’s 
analytical tilt in favor of Taiwan extend 
to other areas, perhaps most critically 
to the author’s assessment (which relies 
on some of his previous, similar work) 
that the threat that China’s conventional 
missile force and counterair systems 
pose to Taiwan’s air force and navy is 
manageable� This is important because 
if this conclusion is wrong Taiwan’s 
exposure to Chinese bombardment 
and blockade, and even invasion, is 
far higher than the author asserts� 
This vulnerability—which depends on 
whether Chinese long-range precision 
strikes can be effective against Taiwan’s 
defenses—will remain a critical factor 
in Taiwan’s ability to deter or withstand 
Chinese uses of force� The implications 
of this competition extend far beyond 
Taiwan� This work would be better 
if it had addressed this issue more 
thoroughly� Another subject that falls in 
this category of insufficient treatment 
is China’s ability to use its maritime 
militia during an invasion of Taiwan�
Nonetheless, there is value in this 
book� Its sources, and the author’s 
background and experiences, provide a 
basis for optimism regarding Taiwan’s 
ability to resist an invasion, which 
the author relates enthusiastically�
WILLIAM S� MURRAY
Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, Economics, and 
the Rise of American Naval Power, 1881–1921, by 
Paul E� Pedisich� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2016� 304 pages� $39�95�
The subject of Paul E� Pedisich’s newest 
work, Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, 
Economics, and the Rise of American 
Naval Power, 1881–1921, is apparent 
from its title� Pedisich proposes that it 
was Congress—rather than the ex-
ecutive branch—that was most directly 
responsible for funding and building 
the U�S� Navy during this pivotal period� 
This well-researched work considers 
four decades of presidential actions, 
congressional legislation, and USN 
policy and their role in the buildup of 
U�S� naval power and capabilities�
These four decades (1881–1921) are 
in many ways the most important in 
U�S� naval history and development, 
spanning the aftermath of the Civil War 
through the end of the First World War� 
At the beginning of this period, Pedisich 
demonstrates the relative feebleness of 
the U�S� Navy in comparison with Euro-
pean naval powers, most notably Great 
Britain� However, this study demon-
strates how the efforts of nine presidents 
and their cabinets, sixteen Secretaries 
of the Navy, and innumerable members 
of Congress were able to transform the 
U�S� Navy from a neglected, presteel, 
and defensively focused organization 
into—in the aftermath of World War 
I—the world’s premier naval power�
Pedisich’s study is notable for its focus 
on the legislative branch’s central place 
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in developing the nation’s maritime 
power and naval war-fighting capabili-
ties� Consequently, it should be noted 
that this work is not a study of naval 
warfare, tactics, or strategy� Rather, 
Pedisich’s extensive research of the 
congressional sources explores the 
personal and political negotiations and 
decisions, and the attendant legislation 
and congressional appropriations, 
that in essence “built” this new Navy 
over the course of four decades�
Perhaps this book’s greatest strength 
is as a catalog of the wealth of 
primary-source material from which 
Pedisich drew: personal and private 
correspondence, political speeches, and 
military and congressional records� 
The book is also rich in a level of detail 
that constitutes a microhistory of the 
period’s naval and congressional politics� 
One thing readers will not be lacking 
after reading this book is information�
Yet Congress Buys a Navy has numerous 
weaknesses� Perhaps the most obvious is 
a lack of clear purpose� While this work 
extensively chronicles naval politics in 
Washington—including congressional 
appropriations, arguments, voting 
records, and political maneuvers—as 
well as decisions from the various Navy 
Secretaries and the rest of the executive 
branch, it falls short in providing the 
larger historical contextualization for 
making sense of this plethora of specific 
information� Furthermore, Pedisich 
does not explain the meaning of this 
massive data dump in any conclusive 
manner� Most significantly, Pedisich’s 
overall assessment of this period is 
uncertain: Did the Navy (and the 
United States) need more funding? 
Less? The reader is left uncertain� 
Despite Pedisich’s richness of detail, 
his assessment of the specific pro-
cesses that transformed the Navy from 
a weak, presteel force into a premier 
fighting force remains ambiguous�
Despite Pedisich’s attention to 
consecutive legislatures, congressional 
appropriations, funding, and various 
Secretaries of the Navy and politicians, 
he does not give the reader regular, 
intermediate updates regarding the 
exact strength and capability of the Navy 
for this period� Occasionally, Pedisich 
does draw attention to numerical values 
of naval forces, but when he does he 
offers little in the way of explanation 
of the lethality and functionality of the 
Navy� As a result, the reader may be 
disappointed at the lack of details on 
the status of naval forces, such as ships 
in use and those under construction�
Absent a consistent and overarching 
metanarrative, the book ultimately reads 
more as a collection of case studies 
on congressional processes and as 
an encyclopedic compilation of at-
tendant economic and political facts 
and statistics—all perhaps of lesser 
interest to armchair naval historians� 
However, Congress Buys a Navy is 
a thoroughly researched work that 
warrants accolades for highlighting 
the key role that Congress played 
in creating a modern U�S� Navy�
BLAKE I� CAMPBELL
Everything under the Heavens: How the Past Helps 
Shape China’s Push for Global Power, by Howard 
W� French� New York: Knopf, 2017� 352 pages� 
$27�95�
As a journalist who has done his 
historical research, Howard W� French 
has produced a highly readable book 
that probes the Chinese concept of tian 
xia, roughly meaning China’s “natural 
dominion over everything under 
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